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Public School Assignment Methods
After Grutter and Gratz:
The View From San Francisco
by DAVID I. LEVINE*
I. Introduction
A few years ago, I chronicled my experiences and reflections as co-
counsel in Ho v. San Francisco Unified School District.' This suit, filed in
1994, challenged the constitutionality of a 1983 consent decree, which had
been the basis for settling a race discrimination case the San Francisco
Branch of the NAACP had brought in 1978 against the San Francisco
Unified School District.2  The consent decree that the district court
approved in 1983 mandated racial or ethnic quotas on the assignment of
children to all public schools in San Francisco. 3 The Ho suit generated
Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law.
A.B., University of Michigan (College of Literature, Science and the Arts); J.D.,
University of Pennsylvania. Co-counsel for plaintiffs in Ho v. San Francisco
Unified School District, No. 94-2418-WHA (N.D. Cal. 1994). The author has
acted in a private capacity in working with Daniel C. Girard of Girard, Gibbs &
DeBartolomeo, LLP, and Anthony K. Lee to represent the Ho plaintiffs. In this
Article, however, the author is writing as a professor of law. All comments and
conclusions expressed in this Article are the author's alone. Nothing stated herein
should be treated as stating any position on behalf of the Ho plaintiffs, co-counsel,
or of Hastings. Because of the author's continuing role as co-counsel, the
discussion and comments are limited to matters in the public record or within the
author's personal and unprivileged knowledge. Professors Adeline Levine,
Murray Levine and Wendy Parker read an earlier draft of the manuscript and
provided useful suggestions. Colleen Kelley and Mary Glennon provided helpful
research assistance in the preparation of this Article.
1. David I. Levine, The Chinese-American Challenge to Court-Mandated
Quotas in San Francisco's Public Schools: Notes from a (Partisan) Participant-
Observer, 16 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 39 (2000). The summary of the Ho suit
presented here is based on that prior article.
2. Id. at 43-51.
3. See S.F. NAACP v. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist., 576 F. Supp. 34 (N.D. Cal.
1983) (approving consent decree). The 1983 consent decree recognized nine racial
[511]
512 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 30:4
attention4 due to the novelty of having a group of Asian Americans
challenging a court-ordered school desegregation plan.
The Ho suit settled in early 1999, on the morning the trial was to
begin.6 The key provisions of the settlement agreement were that the
school district would immediately drop the use of quotas in assigning
children to schools and that the district would develop a new student
assignment plan which would not "assign or admit any student to a
and/or ethnic groups and provided that no one group would be allowed to
constitute more than 45% of the enrollment at any San Francisco public school. Id.
at 40-41. For other details of the 1983 decree, see Levine, supra note 1, at 46-48.
The Ho action is often called the "Lowell High School case;" this is an inaccurate
name because the Ho action challenged the assignment plan for all children in San
Francisco's more than 100 public elementary and secondary schools.
4. See, e.g., Levine, supra note 1, at nn.3-4 (citing popular and scholarly
literature commenting upon the Ho case). As one student commentator put it more
recently: "No other situation crystallizes the failure of constitutional colorblindness
and the dilemma it creates for minority plaintiffs more than the Lowell litigation."
Note, Taking Account of Another Race: Reframing Asian-American Challenges to
Race-Conscious Admissions in Public Schools, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1283, 1288
(2001). Other recent publications commenting upon the suit include: IRIS CHANG,
THE CHINESE IN AMERICA 332-33 (2003); FRANK WU, YELLOW: RACE IN
AMERICA: BEYOND BLACK AND WHITE 141-42 (2002); Julie F. Mead, Conscious
Use of Race as a Voluntary Means to Educational Ends in Elementary and
Secondary Education: A Legal Argument Derived From Recent Judicial Decisions,
8 MICH. J. RACE & L. 63, 70-71 (2002); Juan Perea et al., Thinking About Race
and Races: Reflections and Responses, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1653, 1661 (2001);
Deborah Ramirez & Jana Rumminger, Race, Culture, and the New Diversity in the
New Millennium, 31 CUMB. L. REV. 481 (2000-01); Eric K. Yamamoto, The Color
Fault Lines: Asian American Justice from 2000, 8 ASIAN L.J. 153 (2001);
Comment, Acknowledging Those Stubborn Facts of History: The Vestiges of
Segregation, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1547, 1558-61 (2003); Comment, Bilingual
Education and Resegregation: Reconciling The Apparent Paradox Between
Bilingual Education Programs and Desegregation Goals, 7 ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J.
88 (2001); Richard Delgado, Linking Arms: Recent Books on Interracial Coalition
as an Avenue of Social Reform, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 855, 858, 881 (2003) (book
review); Adrien Katherine Wing, Disoriented: Asian Americans, Law and the
Nation State, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1390 (2001) (book survey); Note, Fatal in Fact?
Federal Courts' Application of Strict Scrutiny to Racial Preferences in Public
Education, 6 TEX. F. ON C.L. & C.R. 173 (2001); Note, Integration Without
Classification: Moving Toward Race-Neutrality in the Pursuit of Public
Elementary and Secondary School Diversity, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1999 (2001); Note,
Power, Merit, and the Imitations of the Black And White Binary in the Affirmative
Action Debate: The Case of Asian Americans at Whitney High School, 8 ASIAN
L.J. 31 (2001).
5. Chinese American parents had been allowed to intervene in a much earlier
school desegregation case in San Francisco. Johnson v. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist.,
500 F.2d 349, 352-54 (9th Cir. 1974). However, the case was abandoned
subsequently by the African American plaintiffs in favor of the litigation that led
directly to the current controversy. See Levine, supra note 1, at 42-43.
6. Levine, supra note 1, at 99-103.
particular school, class or program on the basis of race or ethnicity of that
student."7  The Ho plaintiffs, and later, the court, rejected the school
district's first proposed plan because it did not live up to the written
8agreement. In 2001, the school district ultimately gained the approval of
all the parties and the court for a new race-neutral assignment plan.9 The
new assignment plan has been used twice to assign students - for classes
starting in the fall of 2002 and 2003 - and will be used again for fall 2004
assignments.
This Article turns in Part II to a discussion of the potential impact of
Grutter ° and Gratz1 on student assignment plans in public elementary and
secondary schools. The cases draw a blurry line between permissible and
impermissible admission plans in the higher education context. The
resulting uncertainty may well lead public elementary and secondary
school districts to conclude that it is prudent to use clearly race-neutral
assignment plans rather than face the risk of having to defend a race-
conscious plan through financially expensive and politically divisive
litigation. If so, the experience in San Francisco may be instructive for
other school districts as they attempt to formulate assignment plans that
will both withstand constitutional scrutiny under Grutter and Gratz and
will be politically palatable in their respective locales. Accordingly, Part
III of the Article will detail the new assignment plan in San Francisco's
public schools and report on its mixed results. On the basis of two years'
experience, both the efficacy of the new assignment plan and its political
viability are in question.
7. S.F. NAACP v. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist., 59 F. Supp. 2d 1021, 1025 (N.D.
Cal. 1999) (approving settlement).
8. See Levine, supra note 1, at 108-16; Memorandum Decision and Order,
S.F. NAACP v. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist., No. C-78-1445-WHO (N.D. Cal. Jan. 19,
2000).
9. The new agreement also provided that the consent decree would terminate
without need of further order of the court on December 31, 2005. Amended
Stipulation and [Proposed] Order Re Modification and Termination of Consent
Decree, S.F. NAACP v. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist., No. C-78-1445-WHO (N.D. Cal.
July 11, 2001), available at http://www.gseis.ucla.edu/courses/edlaw/
701settlement.pdf (last visited Feb. 1, 2004). After a fairness hearing, the court
approved the new assignment plan and other related modifications of the consent
decree on October 24, 2001. S.F. NAACP v. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist., 2001 WL
1922333 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 2001).
10. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
11. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
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II. Public School Assignments in the Wake of Grutter and Gratz
In Grutter, Justice O'Connor's majority opinion permitted the use of
race as a factor in admissions to the University of Michigan Law School.
In Gratz, Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion rejected the use of
race in admissions to the University's College of Literature, Science and
the Arts. The difference between what is permissible and what is not under
these two opinions certainly leaves an opening under the federal
constitution for race-based admissions decisions. However, the route
through that opening may prove to be too slight for public elementary and
secondary school systems to utilize for their student assignments.
Since at least 1995, it has become familiar constitutional law that "all
racial classifications imposed by government 'must be analyzed by a
reviewing court under strict scrutiny."''1 2  Race-based action that is
necessary to further a compelling governmental interest does not violate the
constitution if it is narrowly tailored to meet that interest. 13 Until Grutter
and Gratz were decided, however, the lower courts were divided over
which governmental policy goals could be deemed "compelling,"' 14 so that
specific race-conscious means could be tested to determine whether they
were "narrowly tailored," or sufficiently well crafted to achieve those
goals. 
15
Although Justice O'Connor's opinion for the majority in Grutter
asserted that "'searching judicial inquiry into the justification for such race-
based measures"" 6 is necessary, it appears that the search for a compelling
governmental interest no longer need be a prolonged or arduous journey.'
7
Justice O'Connor took a rather open-ended view as to what constituted a
compelling interest when she accepted the Law School's contention that it
had a compelling state interest in attaining a diverse student body.
18
12. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 331 (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515
U.S. 200, 227 (1995)).
13. Id. at331.
14. Ashutosh Bhagwat, Affirmative Action and Compelling Interests: Equal
Protection Jurisprudence at the Crossroads, 4 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 260, 262
(2002).
15. As Ian Ayres has noted, narrow tailoring "is captured by the idea that
remedial classifications should not be too overinclusive or underinclusive." Ian
Ayres, Narrow Tailoring, 43 UCLA L. REv. 1781, 1786 (1996).
16. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 331 (quoting Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S.
469, 493 (1989) (plurality opinion)).
17. See Bhagwat, supra note 14, at 263-71 (reviewing - prior to Grutter -
lower court opinions ranging from restrictive to more open-ended positions on
what constituted a compelling interest).
18. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 332.
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Grutter held "that the Law School has a compelling interest in attaining a
diverse student body," because "attaining a diverse student body is at the
heart of the Law School's proper institutional mission."' 9 As Professor
Robert Post pointed out in his recent commentary on the cases, Justice
O'Connor did not provide a precise description of that mission,20 but
simply referred to certain distinct objectives the Law School maintained
flowed from racial diversity, including: (1) "producing students who are
trained to function 'as professionals' because they will be "prepared to
work within 'an increasingly diverse workforce;' (2) preparing "'students
for.., citizenship' as part of its 'fundamental role in the fabric of
society;"' and (3) training "'our Nation's leaders"' who will have
"'legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry.,,'
2 1
It is possible subsequent judicial opinions will seek to limit the reach
of Grutter and Gratz to the higher education context.22 For example, as
Justice O'Connor observed: "We have long recognized that ... universities
occupy a special niche in our constitutional tradition." 23 She also noted
that in Bakke, Justice Powell supported the principle of student body
diversity as a compelling interest by invoking "cases recognizing a
constitutional dimension, grounded in the First Amendment, of educational
autonomy" of universities.2 4 A court might point to this tradition and
conclude that public schools do not enjoy a special place in the
constitutional pantheon.
It seems unlikely that the two cases will be read so narrowly, however.
In all probability, a public elementary and secondary school district will
19. Id.
20. Id. at 349 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Unlike
the majority, I seek to define with precision the interest being asserted by the Law
School before determining whether that interest is so compelling as to justify racial
discrimination.").
21. Robert C. Post, Foreword. Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture,
Courts, andLaw, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 58-59 (2003) (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at
332-36).
22. "[T]he Court's decision in the University of Michigan cases will not
necessarily determine the constitutionality of voluntary integration plans at the
grade-school level, and. . . the very standards the Court will apply to those plans is
uncertain." James E. Ryan, The Limited Influence of Social Science Evidence in
Modern Desegregation Cases, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1659, 1687 (2003) (written before
Grutter and Gratz were decided).
23. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 332.
24. Id. (citing Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312-13
(1978) (opinion of Powell, J.)). As Justice Kennedy noted, under Bakke there is "a
basis for the Court's acceptance of a university's considered judgment that racial
diversity among students can further its educational task, when supported by
empirical evidence." Grutter; 539 U.S. at 370 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Summer 2003] PUBLIC SCHOOL ASSIGNMENT METHODS
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
have little trouble asserting a compelling governmental interest in a diverse
student body under the Grutter and Gratz opinions. Professor Wendy
Parker has carefully examined the historical deference that courts have
given to local school officials in "promoting the concept of local control
over schools undergoing desegregation., 25 She contends that the deference
to higher education officials which was accepted in Grutter bears many
similarities to the deference paid to local officials in public schools. In her
view, "the judiciary's limited competency in academic affairs, which
includes most race conscious programs based on diversity, substantiates
promoting deference."
26
Professor Post apparently supports this position. He notes that
although Grutter purports to simply adopt Justice Powell's endorsement in
Bakke of racial diversity in higher education, Justice O'Connor did not
acknowledge how much her rationale for pursuing racial diversity actually
differed.27 For Justice Powell, "education was a practice of enlightenment,
of speculation, experiment and creation that thrived on the robust exchange
of ideas characteristically provoked by confrontation between persons of
distinct life experiences., 28 If the compelling interest in diversity is based
solely on creating this dynamic educational process, "Powell's explanation
of the compelling interest of diversity did not reach very far beyond the
specific context of higher education., 29  However, Justice O'Connor's
explanations for why diversity is a compelling interest can "potentially
reach far more widely than do Powell's., 30 If higher education is an
institution which is "instrumental for the achievement of extrinsic social
goods like professionalism, citizenship, or leadership," 31 than so are other
institutions in society. According to Professor Post, the logic of the
25. Wendy Parker, Connecting the Dots: Grutter, School Desegregation, and
Federalism, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1691, 1695 (2004). See also Suzanne E.
Eckes, How Will the Grutter and Gratz Affirmative Action Decisions Impact K-12
Diversity Plans?, 29 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 1 (2003).
26. Id. at 66. Compare Comment, The Case for the New Compelling
Governmental Interest: Improving Educational Outcomes, 80 N.C. L. REV. 923
(2002) (contending that courts will give deference to educational institutions that
rely on educational research regarding the benefits of diversity) with Ryan, supra
note 22, at 1675 (questioning whether courts will give deference to such studies, in
part because "the research appears politicized").
27. For discussion of how "diversity" became a rationale for race-conscious
decision-making, see PETER WOOD, DIVERSITY: THE INVENTION OF A CONCEPT
(2003).





opinion suggests that "each American institution has a compelling interest
in assembling a diverse and therefore legitimate set of leaders. 32
Most importantly, the dissenters in Grutter seem to acknowledge this
as well. Chief Justice Rehnquist, in the primary dissent joined by Justices
Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas, noted that: "[a]lthough the Court recites the
language of our strict scrutiny analysis, its application of that review is
unprecedented in its deference. 33 Justice Scalia separately contended that
if the Law School may use racial discrimination in order to "convey
generic lessons in socialization and good citizenship," so may others, such
as Michigan's civil service system or private employers.34 Justice Thomas
charged that: "[n]o serious effort is made ... to place any theoretical
constraints on an enterprising court's desire to discover still more
justifications for racial discrimination., 35 Justice Kennedy objected that the
majority "refuses to be faithful to the settled principle of strict review"
which is needed in order to avoid having governmental "preferment by
race... destroy confidence in the Constitution and in the idea of
equality. 36
The majority opinion in Gratz is yet more evidence that the Court will
not hold Grutter's endorsement of diversity to a narrow context. Chief
Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Gratz made no effort to assess the
University's proffered justifications for pursuing racial diversity in the
admission of students to its College of Literature Science and the Arts. He
did not ponder - or even leave the issue expressly open for future
consideration - whether the rationale proffered for diversity to an elite law
school's entering class of 350 students applied with equal force to a much
larger undergraduate program enrolling almost 4,000 entering students
32. Id. at 61. See also Robert P. George, Gratz and Grutter: Some Hard
Questions, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1634, 1637 (2003) (noting that "the Court has put
itself on the spot to identify a principled constitutional basis for deciding what is
and isn't a compelling governmental interest"). Courts are applying Grutter in
exactly the manner that Professor Post predicted. E.g., Petit v. City of Chicago,
352 F.3d 1111, 1115 (7th Cir. 2003) (compared to higher education, there is "an
even more compelling need for diversity in a large metropolitan police force
charged with protecting a racially and ethnically divided major American city like
Chicago"), cert. denied, 2004 WL 875135.
33. 539 U.S. 306, 365 (2003) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
34. Id. at 345 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
35. Id. at 356 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
36. Id. at 371 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). For further discussion of the analysis
and evidence presented in Grutter, and a review of the cases from Bakke to
Grutter, see Note, Trump Card or Trouble? The Diversity Rationale in Law and
Education, 83 B.U. L. REv. 1171 (2003).
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from an applicant pool of 13,500.37 Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion for
the majority in Gratz simply noted that the Grutter majority rejected the
contentions that race can be used exclusively to remedy identified
discrimination or that diversity is "too open-ended, ill-defined, and
indefinite to constitute a compelling interest.,
38
In sum, after Grutter and Gratz, there seems little reason to believe
that public school districts will see courts rejecting their attempts to rely
upon diversity as a compelling rationale for adopting nearly any student
assignment system they are likely to select. As one example, a district
court writing shortly before Grutter and Gratz were announced held that
the public elementary and secondary schools in Lynn, Massachusetts were
permitted to take race into account in deciding whether to allow children to
transfer from their neighborhood school to another school in the district.
The trial court found that the school district had put forth compelling
governmental interests in "preparing students to be citizens in a multiracial
society and eliminating the concrete harmful consequences that de facto
segregation inflicts on a public school system. 3 9 There is nothing in the
subsequent opinions from the Supreme Court in Grutter and Gratz to
suggest that this conclusion regarding the school district's assertion of
compelling interests would be unwarranted now.
Although public school officials who desire to use race in making
student assignment decisions will have little trouble articulating a
compelling governmental interest after Grutter, this does not necessarily
mean that they will be able to act upon that desire. If the officials seek to
use race as an express means of selecting and assigning students, after
Gratz, they will have significant difficulty meeting the narrow tailoring
prong of the strict scrutiny analysis. As Justice O'Connor wrote in Grutter:
"The purpose of the narrow tailoring requirement is to ensure that 'the
means chosen "fit" . . . th[e] compelling goal so closely that there is little or
no possibility that the motive for the classification was illegitimate racial
37. Gratz v. Bollinger, 122 F. Supp. 2d 811, 814 (E.D. Mich. 2000), rev'd in
part by 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
38. 539 U.S. 244, 280 (2003) (quoting Brief for Petitioners at 17-18, 40-41).
39. Comfort v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 283 F. Supp. 2d 328, 371 (D. Mass. 2003).
As to the former governmental interest, Justice Scalia may have inadvertently
provided support to the idea that seeking diversity in public school in the name of
making good citizens in a multi-racial society is a compelling governmental
interest. Although he undoubtedly intended the comment to be ironic, he did say
that, "cross-racial understanding" "is a lesson of life.., taught to... people three
feet shorter and twenty years younger than the full-grown adults at the University
of Michigan Law School in institutions ranging from Boy Scout troops to public-
school kindergartens." Grutter, 539 U.S. at 344 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
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prejudice or stereotype.' 40 The Supreme Court majority of five concluded
that the Law School's admissions system "bears the hallmarks of a
narrowly tailored plan.' The Law School's stated goal of attaining a
"critical mass of underrepresented minority students"42 did not "transform
its program into a quota. 43  The Court held that the Law School
admissions program met Justice Powell's criteria for a constitutionally
viable plan. "[T]he Law School engages in a highly individualized, holistic
review of each applicant's file, giving serious consideration to all the ways
an applicant might contribute to a diverse educational environment."
44
On the other hand, in Gratz, the Court determined that Michigan's
undergraduate admissions program failed to meet the narrow tailoring test.
Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion found that Michigan's policy of
automatically distributing twenty points (one-fifth of the points required to
guarantee admission) to every member of the selected underrepresented
minorities was not narrowly tailored to achieve the University's interest in
education diversity.45 Justice O'Connor wrote separately to explain why
she saw a distinction between the Law School's admissions system and the
undergraduate system. The undergraduate system's "mechanized selection
index score, by and large, automatically determines the admissions decision
for each applicant. 46 This index "precludes admissions counselors from
conducting the type of individualized consideration the Court's opinion in
40. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 335 (quoting Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S.
469, 493 (1989) (plurality opinion)).
41. Id. at 336.
42. Id. at 325. The Law School considered only "African-Americans,
Hispanics and Native Americans" as groups which have been historically
discriminated against. Id. at 324. Asians-Americans, for example, do not merit
this treatment at Michigan. Compare Ho v. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist., 147 F.3d 854,
863-64 (9th Cir. 1998) (detailing the "long history of governmental discrimination
based on race [which] has marked the governmental treatment of persons of
Chinese descent" and concluding "the Chinese children of San Francisco would
have an excellent case for preferences compensating for earlier wrongs").
43. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 337. Chief Justice Rehnquist spent considerable effort
in his dissent showing that the admissions data in the record actually demonstrated
that "the Law School has managed its admissions program, not to achieve a
'critical mass,' but to extend offers of admission to members of selected minority
groups in proportion to their statistical representation in the applicant pool." Id. at
369 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). The dissenters said that this amounted to
"precisely the type of racial balancing that the Court itself calls 'patently
unconstitutional."' Id.
44. Id. at 338.
45. 539 U.S. 244, 282-84 (2003).
46. 539 U.S. at 285.
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Grutter... requires.
4 7
One obvious result of the Grutter/Gratz split is "that trusted
admissions officials are now freer to make their decisions without a great
deal of transparency. They need not give reasons for their choices, as long
as they avoid the mechanistic use of race., 48  Indeed, despite the
protestations of the University of Michigan that it was not practical for the
undergraduate program to use the sort of admissions system the Law
School utilized because of the much larger volume of applications,49 the
University has managed to do so in the wake of Gratz. Within two months
of learning that its race-conscious points system was constitutionally
impermissible, Michigan announced a new undergraduate admissions
policy, which it designed to be in line with that permitted in Grutter. The
points system has been eliminated, and the University says that it will "peer
more deeply into the unique circumstances of each student., 50 In order to
provide the sort of holistic review approved in Grutter, Michigan is hiring
twenty more readers and counselors at a cost of nearly $2 million
additional money that will be spent annually on the undergraduate
admissions process.
The approved dividing line between acceptable and unacceptable race-
conscious admissions systems will be of little consolation to public
elementary and secondary school officials. What the Supreme Court has
now pronounced to be constitutionally acceptable - and feasible - in the
confines of the comfortable world of admission offices in the elite
institutions of higher education is of little practical value in the real world
of public school systems. 51  Cash-strapped public school systems are
47. Id. at 286 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice Breyer joined Justice
O'Connor in distinguishing the two programs on this basis. The other seven
Justices found the programs indistinguishable - both were either constitutional
(Justices Stevens, Souter and Ginsburg) or unconstitutional (Chief Justice
Rehnquist, and Justices Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas).
48. Lani Guinier, Admissions Rituals as Political Acts: Guardians at the Gates
of Our Democratic Ideals, 117 HARV. L. REv. 113, 194 (2003). See also Gratz,
539 U.S. at 303 (Justice Ginsburg's observation: "[I]f honesty is the best policy,
surely Michigan's accurately described, fully disclosed College affirmative action
program is preferable to achieving similar numbers through winks, nods, and
disguises.").
49. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 284.
50. Greg Winter, U. of Michigan Alters Policy on Using Race in Admissions,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2003, at A12. See University of Michigan Undergraduate
Application, Guidelines and Policies, available at
http://www.admissions.umich.edu/process (last visited Feb. 1, 2004).
51. See also Guinier, supra note 48, at 185-86 (cautioning: "I take seriously
Justice Thomas's suspicion of 'know-it-all elites' who attempt to make individual
judgments without transparency or democratic accountability. And yet such a
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unlikely to decide to devote significant sums to hiring professionals to staff
huge admissions offices charged with conducting individualized reviews of
student applications to the elementary and secondary schools in the
system.52  And it borders on the absurd to imagine these hypothetical
phalanxes of public school admissions officers purporting to conduct
searching, individualized "holistic reviews" of detailed files of millions of
four-year-olds applying to kindergartens across the country.
This means that, except in very limited cases,53 public schools are
going to have to continue to use relatively mechanical and routinized
methods to assign students to schools. If they seek to incorporate race as a
criterion for assignment in those systems, they will risk having to defend
that choice in litigation. 54  In addition to creating systems that make
system seems to be exactly what Justice O'Connor had in mind.").
52. As one example, San Francisco must place approximately 15,000 students
annually into its system of over 100 schools. Most of these decisions are made at
the ninth, sixth and kindergarten levels, although there are a substantial number of
requests for transfers and for students new to the system at other grade levels as
well.
53. For example, a school with a very special mission might have a genuinely
individualized admissions system. In San Francisco, there are two high schools
that do this. Lowell High School, the famous academic school, employs a race-
neutral admissions system that bears a great deal of resemblance to a college
admissions system. See STUART BIEGEL, SAN FRANCISCO UNIFIED SCHOOL
DISTRICT DESEGREGATION PARAGRAPH 44 INDEPENDENT REVIEW REPORT No. 19
at 83-84 (2001-2002) [hereinafter "2002 MONITOR'S REPORT"] available at
http://www.gseis.ucla.edu/courses/edlaw/sfreptl9.pdf (describing Lowell's current
system of admissions, which combines grades, standardized tests, and additional
factors such as demonstrated ability to overcome hardship, participation in
extracurricular activities, and whether the student is applying from a middle school
which is underrepresented in admissions to the high school from the previous
year). See also Ryan, supra note 22, at 1682 ("Examination schools use merit-
based admissions policies, which typically rely on test scores as one factor in
determining admission."). The School of the Arts, a performing arts magnet
school, requires an audition for admission. See JEFFREY R. HENIG & STEPHEN D.
SUGARMAN, THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF SCHOOL CHOICE, IN SCHOOL CHOICE
AND SOCIAL CONTROVERSY: POLITICS, POLICY, AND LAW 17-21 (Stephen D.
Sugarman & Frank R. Kemerer eds., 1999) (discussing magnet and other
specialized schools). The plan recently approved in Lynn, Massachusetts, was a
voluntary transfer plan available after all students were guaranteed assignment to
their neighborhood schools. See Comfort v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 283 F. Supp. 2d
328, 347-49 (D. Mass. 2003). See also James E. Ryan & Michael Heise, The
Political Economy of School Choice, 111 YALE L.J. 2043, 2064-73 (2002)
(discussing transfer programs).
54. For examples where school districts have been unable to satisfy courts that
their race-conscious plans were narrowly tailored, see Eisenberg v. Montgomery
County Pub. Schs., 197 F.3d 123 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1019
(2000); Tuttle v. Arlington County Sch. Bd., 195 F.3d 698 (4th Cir. 1999), cert.
dismissed, 529 U.S. 1050 (2000); Wessmann v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790 (lst Cir.
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individualized decisions, school districts will have to pass several
additional hurdles to show that their admissions systems are narrowly
tailored under Grutter. First, although they will not have to exhaust "every
conceivable race-neutral alternative," 55 they will have to demonstrate
"serious, good faith consideration of workable race-neutral alternatives that
will achieve the diversity" desired.56 Second, the school district will have
to demonstrate that the admissions system does not "unduly burden
individuals who are not members of the favored racial and ethnic groups. 57
Third, the school district must show that its race-conscious admissions
system has a "termination point,"58 a point in time when the race-conscious
system would no longer be necessary or utilized.
Justice Scalia raised the specter that the "Grutter-Gratz split double
header seems perversely designed to prolong the controversy and the
litigation., 59 He speculated that future lawsuits will challenge whether
particular plans fall under Grutter or under Gratz. For example, he
imagined suits challenging whether there was sufficient individualized
evaluation of applicants, whether there were actually separate admissions
tracks for applicants of different races, whether a particular institution has
crossed the line between seeking a critical mass and creating a de facto
quota, whether any educational benefits flow from racial diversity in a
particular setting, and whether particular institutions "talk the talk of
multiculturalism and racial diversity in the courts but walk the walk of
tribalism on their campuses with minority-only" organizations and
programs. He also suggested that there would be suits - not unlike Ho -
on behalf of groups "intentionally short changed in the institution's
1998); Memorandum Decision and Order, S.F. NAACP v. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist.,
No. C-78-1445-WHO (N.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 2000). For a relatively rare example
where school officials did make the requisite showing, see Doe v. Kamehameha
Schools/Bernice Pauahi Bishop Estate, 295 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1145 (D. Haw.
2003). In approving the race-conscious admissions plan, the court emphasized the
"exceptionally unique circumstances" of a private school operating a remedial
race-conscious admissions policy to rectify socioeconomic and educational
disadvantage with the express encouragement of Congress because of the special
trust relationship the United States maintains with indigenous Native Hawaiians.
Id. See also John Tehranian, A New Segregation? Race, Rice v. Cayetano, and the
Constitutionality of Hawaiian-Only Education and the Kamehameha Schools, 23
U. HAW. L. REv. 109 (2000).
55. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 339 (2003).
56. Id. at 339.
57. Id. at 340 (quoting Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 630
(1990) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)).
58. Id. at 341. Justice O'Connor suggested that twenty-five years might be an
appropriate goal. Id. at 342.
59. Id. at 345 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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composition of its generic minority 'critical mass."' 60 Justice Scalia
professed that he did not look forward to these cases; it is a safe bet that
many public school administrators - the future defendants-will not either.
Given these realities, one may assume that public school officials will
search for race-neutral means to assign students, if those means hold at
least some prospect of fostering diversity as well. 61 The officials may
conduct this search out of a number of motivations. Some officials may
desire to avoid litigation, which even if successful, has the potential of
being time-consuming and expensive.62  Others may search for a
mechanism that is more politically palatable than an overtly race-conscious
plan.63 Other districts may have no choice but to seek race-neutral plans
because they are located in places which forbid the sort of race-conscious
plans Grutter and Gratz permit.64 Still others will want to look at the
experiences in other places in order to fulfill the mandate that they have
considered "workable race-neutral alternatives" to race-conscious plans.
65
60. ld. at 346.
61. For a description of how the public schools in Boston, Massachusetts had
to abandon illegal, race-conscious admissions procedures in favor of race-neutral
ones. See, e.g., Boston's Children First v. Boston Sch. Comm., 260 F. Supp. 2d 318
(D. Mass. 2003) (permitting school district to reduce the preference allotted to
neighborhood children so that other children could apply for places in those
schools, in the hopes of achieving racial diversity).
62. The Comfort case illustrates the point. Even though the district court
upheld the small school district's limited transfer plan, it did so only after four
years of litigation and after having heard from many defense witnesses who
presented substantial evidence and data specifically on the Lynn Plan. The school
district did not try to skimp by relying on "unsubstantiated generalizations about
race relations, or the subjective perceptions of school officials. Nor did they rely
on experts who knew everything about other systems in other parts of the country,
but nothing about Lynn." Comfort v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 283 F. Supp. 2d 328, 400
(D. Mass. 2003). Such a complete defense takes resources of time and money,
which every district might not possess or care to devote to litigation rather than
education. Compare Tehranian, supra note 53, at 109 (Kamehameha Schools can
mount an expensive defense of their race-conscious admissions policy because
among educational institutions, they have an endowment second only to
Harvard' s).
63. Guinier, supra note 48, at 185-86.
64. For example, no school system in California is free to create a race-
conscious assignment system that might possibly thread the needle between
Grutter and Gratz. They are forbidden to do so under Art. I, § 31 of the
Constitution of California. See Crawford v. Huntington Beach Union High Sch.
Dist., 98 Cal. App. 4th 1275 (2002) (rejecting high school transfer policy with a
racial balancing component); Comment, Proposition 209 and School
Desegregation Programs in California, 38 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 661 (2001).
65. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339. For discussion of lotteries as an alternative, see
Pauline T. Kim, The Colorblind Lottery, 72 FORDHAM L. REv. 9 (2003). Random
assignments would be another race-neutral alternative.
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
All of these officials should be interested in the results from San Francisco
as they ponder what to do about their own student assignment systems.
III. The San Francisco Experience
As indicated above, the San Francisco Unified School District has had
some difficulty in creating a legal student assignment plan. The Ho suit
challenged a 1983 court-approved student assignment plan that imposed
quotas on the percentage of children of any one race or ethnicity that could
attend any particular school.66 The school district agreed to abandon this
assignment plan in February 1999 and to develop a new assignment plan
for admissions for the future.67 In creating the new plan, school officials
could consider many factors as aspirational goals in setting lawful criteria
for admission, including racial and ethnic diversity, so long as these factors
were not the "primary or predominant consideration in determining
admission criteria., 68 Further, the new plan could not use race or ethnicity
69as a criterion for assignment or admission to a school, class or program.
As discussed in full elsewhere, in the fall of 1999, the school district
submitted a plan, which it proposed to use for school assignments for the
fall of 2000.70 This plan proposed to use four factors in making admissions
66. S.F. NAACP v. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist., 576 F. Supp. 34, 40, 53 (N.D. Cal.
1983).
67. S.F. NAACP v. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist., 59 F. Supp. 2d 1021, 1025 (N.D.
Cal. 1999). See also Levine, supra note 1, at 100-02.
68. The parties adopted this standard on the basis of voting districting cases
such as Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995), because of the expectation
that the school district would try to achieve diversity by altering the attendance
zones for various schools. Levine, supra note 1, at 109. For discussion of the
standard in the voting context, see, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan, Easing the Spring:
Strict Scrutiny and Affirmative Action After the Redistricting Cases, 43 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 1569 (2002); Kathleen M. Sullivan, After Affirmative Action, 59
OHIO ST. L.J. 1039 (1998).
69. Specifically:
The parties acknowledge that SFUSD officials have the duty and authority
to determine lawful criteria for admission to all schools in the SFUSD.
The parties further acknowledge that in setting those criteria, state and
federal law provide that district officials may consider many factors,
including the desire to promote residential, geographic, economic, racial
and ethnic diversity in all SFUSD schools. However, race or ethnicity
may not be the primary or predominant consideration in determining such
admission criteria. Further, the SFUSD will not assign or admit any
student to a particular school, class or program on the basis of the race or
ethnicity of that student, except as related to the language needs of the
student or otherwise to assure compliance with controlling federal or state
law.
S.F. NAACP, 59 F. Supp. 2d at 1025 ( C).
70. Levine, supra note 1, at 110-14.
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decisions: (1) socioeconomic status; (2) proficiency in English; (3) math
and reading achievement levels; and (4) race or ethnicity. 7 1 After giving
the school district ample opportunity to explain its plan - which appeared
blatantly improper under the settlement agreement - or to reach an
accommodation with the parties,72 the district court rejected the proposed
plan in January 2000 as failing to meet both the constitutional test for strict
scrutiny and the terms of the settlement agreement.73
After the court rejected the proposed assignment plan in early 2000,
the school district chose to replace the lead attorney who had represented
the school district since 1978. 74 The school district also hired a new
superintendent, Arlene Ackerman, who began work in August 2000. 75 She
initiated a process to develop a comprehensive plan to address the various
goals of the consent decree and to create a signature blueprint for her
administration.
The plan, entitled "Excellence for All: A Five-Year Comprehensive
Plan to Achieve Educational Equity in the San Francisco Unified School
District for School Years 2001-02 through 2005-06" was filed with the
court in April 2001.76 After some negotiations, the parties resolved their
differences regarding certain aspects of the Excellence for All plan, and
submitted a settlement agreement to the district court for approval. The
settlement agreement contained three major points.
First the parties agreed to extend the consent decree by three years, to
December 31, 2005. 7 This secured funding from the State of California
71. Id. at 110-11 (describing San Francisco Unified School District, Proposed
New Student Assignment Plan (Nov. 23, 1999), attached to Local School District
Defendants' Resubmission of Proposed New Student Assignment Plan Pursuant to
Order Filed November 2, 1999, S.F. NAACP v. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist., No 78-
1445-WHO (N.D. Cal. Nov. 23, 1999)).
72. Levine, supra note 1, at 112 n.407 (noting how the court gave school
district opportunity to show how plan was constitutional); id. at 113 n.412 (noting
how the court ordered acting superintendent of schools and board members to meet
with parties and mediator).
73. Memorandum Decision and Order, S.F. NAACP v. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist.,
No. C-78-1445-WHO (N.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 2000).
74. S.F. NAACP v. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist., 2001 WL 1922333, at *5 (N.D.
Cal. Oct. 24, 2001).
75. Id. at *2. Superintendent Ackerman had been in Washington, D.C. for the
prior two years. Justin Blum & Valerie Strauss, Ackerman Quits As D.C. School
Superintendent; Job in San Francisco Accepted, WASH. POST, Mar. 18, 2000, at
Al.
76. S.F. NAACP, 2001 WL 1922333, at *2. The Excellence For All plan is
available at http://www.sfusd.edu/news/pdf/X4Allrev021302.pdf [hereinafter
Excellence for All Plan].
77. As the court noted in approving the settlement agreement, the school
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through the end of the 2005-06 school year to implement the decree.78
Further, instead of making the termination "subject to Court approval, 79
the new agreement provided that the consent decree would terminate on
that date without need for a further order of the court. 80 To confirm the
finality of that termination date, two defendants, the school district and the
state superintendent of education, stipulated that they would oppose any
future requests for extension of the court's jurisdiction.81
Second, the school district agreed to adopt a system of monitoring the
expenditures of consent decree funds. The revised agreement specified that
the priority for expenditures of consent decree funds would be directed to
measures that would directly enhance student achievement. 82  The
district's request for an extension of time was supported by several factors. First,
was the sudden resignation of Superintendent Rojas shortly after the 1999
settlement was approved. This put school district leadership into uncertainty for a
year. Second, the school district management had to spend considerable attention
on financial matters. Third, was the delay caused by the litigation over the
previous proposed assignment plan. Finally, there was the school district's change
of counsel. All these factors "negatively affected the District's ability to move
forward." S.F. NAACP, 2001 WL 1922333, at *5.
78. Subsequent legislation has insured at least partial state funding even after
the consent decree terminates.
79. S.F. NAACP v. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist., 59 F. Supp. 2d 1021, 1025 ( A)
(N.D. Cal. 1999).
80. See Amended Stipulation and [Proposed] Order Re: Modification and
Termination of Consent Decree, S.F. NAACP v. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist., No. C-78-
1445-WHO (N.D. Cal. July 11, 2001).
81. The Ho plaintiffs insisted on a termination date because it is consistent
with the tenets of corrective justice, which assumes that courts will displace the
usual policy makers for a limited time only. See Levine, supra note 1, at 140-42.
Making the termination date even more certain than it had been previously, with
the school district having the added condition of being forbidden from opposing
the termination, was necessary in this case in recognition of the demonstrated
reluctance of this school district and school districts in general from actually
seeking termination of decrees. See Levine, supra note 1, at 124-29 (discussing
"The Myth of the Desire for Return to Local Control"); Wendy Parker, The Future
of School Desegregation, 94 N.C. L. REV. 1157, 1159-60 (2000) (Empirical work
shows that, "Far from suggesting that school districts are clamoring for dismissal
in great numbers (the common perception), these studies reveal that only a small
percentage of defendants request an end to their desegregation lawsuits.").
Making termination a matter of deus ex machina also continued to avoid
the problems of wrestling with the unknowns and logical problems of trying to
meet the standards for showing that a school district has achieved unitary status.
Bd. of Educ. of Okla. City Pub. Schs. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 246 (1991)
(declining to define the term "unitary" precisely). See Levine, supra note 1, at 80-
81, 122; Wendy Parker, The Decline of Judicial Decisionmaking: School
Desegregation and District Court Judges, 81 N.C. L. REv. 1623, 1647 (2003);
Ryan, supra note 22, at 1671-74.
82. See S.F. NAACP, 2001 WL 1922333, at *3; Amended Stipulation and
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Independent Monitor, Professor Stuart Biegel of UCLA, agreed to conduct
a review of the budget to evaluate the efficacy of the proposed expenditures
in light of the consent decree priorities. The other parties were also given
the right to object to specific budget items. Finally, an independent audit,
conducted by state professionals, was to be instituted on a twice-yearly
basis.
83
Third, and most important for present purposes, the settlement
contained modifications to the consent decree regarding student assignment
plans. The language banning assignment methods was strengthened to read:
"[T]he SFUSD shall not use or include race or ethnicity as a criterion or
factor to assign any student to any school, class, classroom, or program,
and shall not use race or ethnicity as a primary or predominant
consideration in setting any such criteria or factors." 84 As part of the
[Proposed] Order Re: Modification and Termination of Consent Decree, S.F.
NAACP v. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist., No-C-78-1445 (N.D. Cal., July 11, 2001).
83. All these measures were designed to ensure that the tens of millions of
dollars of Consent Decree funds were expended properly. This was a matter of
long-standing concern. See Levine, supra note 1, at 54 n.88, 85-86 n.266. See
also STUART BIEGEL, SAN FRANCISCO UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT
DESEGREGATION, PARAGRAPH 44 INDEPENDENT REVIEW, REPORT No. 15 at 131
(1997-1998), available at http://www.gseis.ucla.edu/courses/edlaw/sfrept15.pdf
(report on S.F. NAACP v. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist., No. C-78-1445-WHO (N.D. Cal.
July 31, 1998)); STUART BIEGEL, SAN FRANCISCO UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT
DESEGREGATION, PARAGRAPH 44 INDEPENDENT REVIEW, REPORT No. 16 at 172
(1998-1999), available at http://www.gseis.ucla.edu/courses/edlaw/sfreptl6.htm
(report on S.F. NAACP v. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist., No. C-78-1445-WHO (N.D. Cal.
July 29, 1999)); STUART BIEGEL, SAN FRANCISCO UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT
DESEGREGATION, PARAGRAPH 44 INDEPENDENT REVIEW, REPORT No. 17 at 57
(1999-2000), available at http://www.gseis.ucla.edu/courses/edlaw/Reportl7-
SFUSD.pdf (report on S.F. NAACP v. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist., No. C-78-1445-
WHO (N.D. Cal. July 27, 2000)); STUART BIEGEL, SAN FRANCISCO UNIFIED
SCHOOL DISTRICT DESEGREGATION, PARAGRAPH 44 INDEPENDENT REVIEW,
REPORT No. 18 at 66-76 (2000-2001) [hereinafter 2001 MONITOR'S REPORT],
available at http://www.gseis.ucla.edu/courses/edlaw/sfreptl8.htm (report on S.F.
NAACP v. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist., No. C-78-1445-WHO (N.D. Cal. July 30,
2001)).
The budget oversight seems to be having its intended effect. See 2002
MONITOR'S REPORT, supra note 53, at 5-11 (report on S.F. NAACP v. S.F. Unified
Sch. Dist., No-78-1445-WHO (N.D. Cal. July 31, 2002)); STUART BIEGEL, SAN
FRANCISCO UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT DESEGREGATION, PARAGRAPH 44
INDEPENDENT REVIEW, REPORT No. 20 at 12-13 (2002-2003) [hereinafter 2003
MONITOR'S REPORT], available at http://www.gseis.ucla.edu/ courses/ edlaw/
sfrept20.pdf (report on S.F. NAACP v. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist., No-78-1445-WHO
(N.D. Cal. July 31, 2003)).
84. S.F. NAACP, 2001 WL 1922333, at *3. The agreement also creates a
procedure for the parties to address identifiable racial or ethnic concentration at
particular schools. Id. See Amended Stipulation and [Proposed] Order Re
Modification and Termination of Consent Decree at 5-6, S.F. NAACP v. S.F.
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settlement, the school district proposed a new system of student
assignments to nearly all of the 114 schools in the system.
85
The new system uses a multi-step hierarchy of assignments, followed
by the application of a complex multifactor Diversity Index. s6 The
Unified Sch. Dist., No. C-78-1445-WHO (N.D. Cal. July 11, 2001), available at
http://www.gseis.ucla.edu/courses/edlaw/701settlement.pdf. However, no party
has invoked the procedure to date and the school district has not made any effort to
undertake the empirical work necessary as a predicate for proposing any such
modifications.
Keeping the means of assignment race-neutral was important to the Ho
plaintiffs for several reasons. First, it was a central goal of the lawsuit. "[T]he Ho
plaintiffs think children should be treated as individuals, not according to whether
their skin color or ethnicity will contribute to someone's notion of the ideal
distribution of races and ethnicities." Levine, supra note 1, at 141. See also
Memorandum Decision and Order, S.F. NAACP v. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist., No. C-
78-1445-WHO at 33 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 2000). Second, in view of the prior failure
of the defendants to justify any race-based student assignment plan, there was no
more legal justification for the court to approve one in 2001 than there was in
1999. S.F. NAACP v. S.F. Unified. Sch. Dist., 59 F. Supp. 2d 1021, 1029 (N.D.
Cal 1999). Finally, the Ho plaintiffs believed that the California Supreme Court's
strict interpretation of the ban on race-conscious programs approved by the voters
through Proposition 209 meant that the school district would have to adopt a race-
neutral plan as the parties contemplated how the school district would operate after
the federal consent decree was lifted and the case was dismissed. See Hi-Voltage
Wire Works, Inc. v. City of San Jose, 24 Cal. 4th 537 (2000); Levine, supra note 1,
at 134 n.526. This view of state law was confirmed when the California Court of
Appeal subsequently held that Proposition 209 prohibited race-conscious school
transfer programs, even if they might be permissible under federal law. Crawford
v. Huntington Beach Union High Sch. Dist, 98 Cal. App. 4th 1275, 1285-86
(2002). But see Friery v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., 300 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2002)
(certifying similar questions to the California Supreme Court).
Under the consent decree, the school district is still obligated to "eliminate
racial/ethnic segregation or identifiability in any school, classroom, or program,
and to achieve throughout the system, the broadest practicable distribution of
students from all racial/ethnic groups comprising the general student population."
S.F. NAACP, 576 F. Supp. at 40, 53 ( 12).
85. Two high schools, Lowell and the School of the Arts, were not included in
the assignment plan because of their special criteria for admission. S.F. NAACP,
2001 WL 1922333, at *3.
86. The agreement makes clear that the diversity index was the school district's
concept. See Amended Stipulation and [Proposed] Order Re: Modification and
Termination of Consent Decree at 4, S.F. NAACP v. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist., No. C-
78-1445-WHO (N.D. Cal. July 11, 2001), available at http://www.gseis.ucla.edu/
courses/edlaw/701 settlement.pdf ("The Assignment Method... was developed
and adopted by the SFUSD, and the decision to use that particular Assignment
Method was not taken at the request of any party or imposed by the Court."). The
index is described as Attachment B to the Agreement. Id. See also
http://www.gseis.ucla.edu/courses/edlaw/appv-01.htm (Attachment B to
Stipulation to 2001 MONITOR'S REPORT); http://portal.sfusd.edu/template/default.
cfm?page=policy.placement (the school district's website). Although the
assignment system applies to all initial assignments and transfers, as a practical
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assignment system operates as follows. Students are eligible to attend any
school in the district.87 First, applicants with a sibling already attending the
desired school are admitted automatically. Second, students with
specialized learning needs such as no proficiency in English or special
education are assigned automatically to their desired schools with the
program meeting those needs.
All students who are not assigned in either of these steps are assigned
according to the six binary parameters comprising the Diversity Index.88
Enrollment is determined from a pool of specific schools requested and
ranked by the student.89 Computerized Diversity Index calculations are
made for each requested school as determined by the applicant pool it
receives. Under the Diversity Index process, the school district calculates a
numerical profile of all student applicants.90 The current Diversity Index is
composed of six binary factors: socioeconomic status, 9' academic
matter, the primary points of entry into the SFUSD system are at kindergarten,
sixth grade and ninth grade.
87. The school district dropped its older practice of automatically assigning
students entering middle and high school into the school for that attendance zone.
2002 MONITOR'S REPORT, supra note 53, at 80. Thus, all children had to apply for
assignment when changing schools.
88. This description of the mechanics of the diversity index is adapted from the
2003 MONITOR'S REPORT, supra note 83, at 26-28. The mechanics are also
described in the Excellence for All Plan, supra note 76, at 96 et seq.
89. In the first two years of operation, students were allowed to rank up to five
schools. See Excellence for All Plan, supra note 76, at 101. For fall 2004
admissions, students will be allowed to rank up to seven schools. See SAN
FRANCISCO UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT
S.F. UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT'S "EDUCATIONAL PLACEMENT CENTER," available
at http://portal.sfusd.edu/template/default.cfin?page=policy.placement.faq
[hereinafter Frequently Asked Questions]. This change is designed to increase the
number of students who get into a school of their choosing, even if it is a low
priority school. For example, there are just ten basic high schools in the system.
90. The Diversity Index is an application of the statistical tools of permutations
and combinations to multinomials to generate a statistical means for measuring
diversity in any population. See Excellence for All Plan, supra note 76, at 102. It
indicates the magnitude of diversity, as measured by the selected variables, within
a group of individuals. Id. The Diversity Index is a measure of "how likely it is
that two individuals selected at random out of a group will be of different types" in
the selected variables. Id. The Diversity Index number is calculated between 0
and 1; "the higher the [index] score, the more diverse the group is with respect to
the ... [measured variables]. Id. "The lower the score, the less diverse the group
is with respect to ... [those variables]." Id. The Diversity Index is explained in
Excellence for All Plan, supra note 76, at 102-03. The Diversity Index was
derived by a consultant hired by the school district who based the statistical tool on
Stanley Lieberson, Measuring Population Diversity, 34 AM. SOC. REv. 850
(1969).
91. The application form asks whether the student and/or family participate in:
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achievement status, 92 mother's educational background,
93 language status, 94
academic performance index,95 and home language.96
If there are more seats available at a grade level in a school than the
number of applicants for that school, then the student is tentatively
admitted. If the school is also the student's first choice, then the student is
assigned to that school without the index having had any effect on the
process. As indicated above, for more than 60% of the students, the
operation of the index does not affect their school assignments.
If there are fewer seats available at a school than the number of
applicants, then for each relevant class at that school, the Diversity Index
process will be the basis for the assignment of students to that school. First,
the school district's computer calculates a composite Diversity Index of the
students already admitted to that class (for example because of the sibling
preference) based on the six binary factors. Student applicants for each
school who contribute the most mathematical diversity to the relevant class
at that school are then admitted provisionally one at a time. The Diversity
Index is recalculated each time a new student is admitted to the class and
then the next student who contributes the most to diversity is admitted.
This continues until the class is filled. The Diversity Index process is done
twice. The first time is limited to students who live in the school's
attendance area and who have listed the school as one of the desired
choices.97 The first run assigns attendance area applicants so long as they
free/reduced lunch programs, CalWORKS (public assistance), or lives in public
housing. See Excellence for All Plan, supra note 76, at 101 -03. A zero is assigned
for purposes of the binary calculations if the student does not participate in any of
these programs, and a one is assigned if he/she participates in at least one of these
programs. Id. at 103.
92. For incoming kindergartners, a zero is assigned if the student has not
attended preschool, and a one is assigned if he/she has. Id. at 101. For students
entering first or second grade, the binary division is between those scoring at or
above the 50th percentile on the Brigance test (zero) and those scoring below
(one). Id. at 101-02. For all other grades, the division is between those scoring at
or above the 30th percentile in reading and math on the SAT9 (zero) and those
scoring below (one). Id. at 102.
93. If the mother attended any post-high school education, a zero is assigned.
Id. If she did not, a one is assigned. Id.
94. If the student is proficient in English, a zero is assigned. Id. If not, then a
one is assigned. Id.
95. If the API of the "sending school" (the school the student last attended or
the student's neighborhood school if the student has not yet been to school) is
ranked at 4 or above (on a scale of 10), then a zero is assigned. Id. If the school's
API is below 4, then a one is assigned. Id.
96. If English is the primary language spoken in the student's home, then a
zero is assigned. Id. If it is not, then a one is assigned. Id.
97. Attendance areas are largely, but not exclusively, contiguous to the school.
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contribute to the diversity of the particular grade at the school. Once all
students from the attendance area who contribute to diversity according to
the index are admitted, then the second run commences. The second run is
for all applicants - whether in the attendance area or not - who have not yet
been assigned to the school. The computer uses the Diversity Index
formula to determine which students in this pool will most contribute to the
diversity of the grade in question in that school.
98
After these calculations, it is quite possible that students have been
provisionally assigned to more than one school. If so, a reconciliation
process places a student who has been admitted into more than one school
into his/her most highly ranked choice.99 The reconciliation process will
open up places at other schools, so the computer will continue to use the
Diversity Index to recalculate provisional assignments until as many
applicants as possible are assigned to a school they have chosen. Students
not assigned to a school of their choice are placed in a nearby school in
which there is space available. The student is also permitted to choose
another school with space available or to enter a waiting pool for spaces to
open up in over-subscribed schools. As places open, the Diversity Index is
run to select students to be assigned to schools with waiting pools. 00
The school district's system is a complex version of a controlled
choice plan.101 The system does not use race as an express criterion for
school assignments. 0 2 Parents may select the schools from which the
See Excellence for All Plan, supra note 76, at 98. As a result of the 1983 consent
decree, many schools have so-called "satellite zones," which are located in poorer
areas of the city. Id. Students living in the satellite zones are given the same
priority as students living in the contiguous attendance area. Id. This is another
way in which the school district is attempting to foster economic and racial
diversity.
98. In the event of a tie, the attendance area child will be given priority over a
non-attendance area child; the attendance area child who ranked the school higher
than another attendance area child will be given priority, and remaining ties will be
resolved randomly. See id. at 100-01.
99. As originally conceived, the student admitted into more than one school
would be admitted into the school to which he/she most contributed to the
mathematical diversity of the school. See id. at 101. After the first year, this was
changed in response to parental suggestion.
100. Also included are students who did not apply under the school district's
initial application deadline. See id. at 101.
101. See, e.g., RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, ALL TOGETHER Now: CREATING
MIDDLE-CLASS SCHOOLS THROUGH PUBLIC SCHOOL CHOICE 116-30 (Brookings
Institute Press, 2001); CHARLES V. WILLIE & MICHAEL ALVES, CONTROLLED
CHOICE: A NEW APPROACH TO DESEGREGATED EDUCATION AND SCHOOL
IMPROVEMENT (1996).
102. S.F. NAACP v. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist., 2001 WL 1922333, at *10 (N.D.
Cal. Oct. 24, 2001) ("Each of the factors chosen by the District for use in its
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district will endeavor to place their child; the assignment system puts
priority on assignments which will keep siblings together and on
assignments for students eligible for specialized programs such as for
language immersion. The selected variables are directed at achieving
diversity on the basis of social class, educational level, and language. Some
of these factors may be somewhat correlated with race (for example,
eligibility for public housing), but it cannot be said that, taken as a whole,
the primary or predominant consideration behind selecting this particular
group of variables is race.10 3 Rather, the overall aim of the district is to
balance parental desires while enhancing diversity as measured by the
selected variables. 1
04
The school district's goal is in line with the arguments of those
academic writers who believe that seeking socioeconomic integration of
public school populations is the most feasible way to achieve diversity in
an era which has probably neared the legal and political limits of using
racial desegregation strategies in public schools.'0 5 Richard Kahlenberg,
who is probably the most prominent advocate of this approach, has
discussed these limitations in his 2001 book, All Together Now: Creating
Middle Class Schools Through Public Choice.'0 6  He contends that
diversity index can apply to students of any race or ethnicity.").
103. For example, having two of the six variables concerned with language
would seem to emphasize whether a child's family recently immigrated to the
United States (whether from Latin America, Asia or Eastern Europe), rather than
race per se. Similarly, measuring the mother's educational level as having merely
completed high school or not seems more correlated with social class than with
race.
104. See Excellence for All Plan, supra note 76, at 99 ("[I]n some instances,
educational harm can result from having high concentrations of students with
particular characteristics - for example high concentrations of students who are less
prepared or who have fewer familial resources to support the educational process
are likely to have a negative impact on the academic performance of all students in
the school.").
105. Richard Kahlenberg has hailed San Francisco's attempt to create an
assignment plan based on socio-economic variables as "extraordinary" and
"groundbreaking." Richard D. Kahlenberg, Economic School Desegregation,
EDUC. WK. 52 (Mar. 31, 1999).
106. In addition to his recent book on socio-economic integration in public
schools, Kahlenberg, a scholar at the Century Foundation, has also advocated
class-based admissions to selective high schools and colleges. RICHARD D.
KAHLENBERG, THE REMEDY: CLASS, RACE, AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION (1996).
Others advocating similar approaches include: WILLIAM J. WILSON, THE TRULY
DISADVANTAGED (1987); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Affirmative Action Based on
Economic Disadvantage, 43 UCLA L. REv. 1913 (1996); Molly S. McUsic, The
Future of Brown v. Board of Education: Economic Integration of the Public
Schools, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1334 (2004). See also Sara Rimer, Schools Try
Integration by Income, Not Race, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 2003, at Al.
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continuing to base school desegregation upon race has at least four major
limitations. As a legal strategy, the Supreme Court's cases have made it
very difficult to utilize race as the basis for a student assignment system.'
0 7
Second, the focus on race misses what Kahlenberg believes is the "key
element" educationally, which is that the life chances of students are
improved only with economic integration.'0 8 Third, he argues that the
focus on racial desegregation makes the insulting assumption that
predominantly African American schools must be bad. 0 9  Finally,
Kahlenberg observes that the focus on racial desegregation has turned
working class whites and African Americans into political adversaries." 0
Kahlenberg and his intellectual allies"' contend that schools that use
economic integration have a chance to create middle class environments for
the benefit of all students." 2
Whatever benefits may accrue from economic integration of schools
in theory, however, the actual success of the Diversity Index in San
Francisco to date is very much a matter of point of view. As the
independent monitor reports, experience had shown that at least 60% of the
schools in the district are able to accommodate all of the students
requesting that school." 3 The school district reports a similar finding by
stating that 63% of all applicants received their first choice assignment."
4
With parents able to select up to five choices" 5 for their children, the
school district reports that over 80% of students are assigned to a school of
their choice.1 6 From a mechanical point of view, the Diversity Index works
107. KAHLENBERG, supra note 101, at 90-93.
108. Id. at 90, 93-95.
109. Id. at 90, 95-96. See also Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 114 (1995)
(Thomas, J., concurring) ("It never ceases to amaze me that the courts are so
willing to assume that anything that is predominately black must be inferior.").
110. KAHLENBERG, supra note 101, at 90, 96.
111. See, e.g., Lowell P. Weicker & Richard D. Kahlenberg, The New
Educational Divide, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Oct. 9, 2002, at 9.
112. KAHLENBERG, supra note 101, at 76; see generally KAHLENBERG, supra
note 106.
113. 2003 MONITOR'S REPORT, supra note 83, at 29.
114. S.F. UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, STUDENT ASSIGNMENT PROCESS,
available at http://portal.sfusd.edu/template/default.cfln?page=policy.placement.
process (last visited Feb. 1, 2004). The school district reports that for the fall of
2003, 67% of kindergarten students, 73% of sixth grade students and 64% of ninth
grade students received a placement offer to their first choice school. Id.
115. For fall 2004, this has been expanded to seven choices. See
http://portal.sfusd.edu/template/default.cfm?page=policy.placement.faq
("Frequently Asked Questions" about S.F. Unified School District's "Educational
Placement Center").
116. The school district's web site indicates that 82% of students are assigned to
Summer 2003] PUBLIC SCHOOL ASSIGNMENT METHODS
HASTINGS CONS'ITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
statistically to make the entering classes of students as diverse as possible,
given the parameters of other school district policies, such as granting
automatic admission to siblings and drawing the classes from parent-
generated pools of applicants for particular schools.' 7 Under the Diversity
Index process, however, the student body of any particular school can be
no more diverse than the original pool applying for that school.
On the other hand, the monitor's annual reports also show that the
Diversity Index system has some serious flaws. Parents, teachers, students
and school administrators frequently observe that the Diversity Index is
incredibly complex to explain and comprehend, 1 8 a finding, which I
confirm repeatedly as I communicate with frustrated parents. When
something as important as school assignments is at stake, having a complex
system does not alleviate anxiety. Further, many people assume that the
binary variables of the Diversity Index operate as a point system, so they
see their children as being penalized because of their success."19 The
a school of their choice under this system. http://portal.sfusd.edu/template/
default.cfm?page=policy.placement.process (Student Assignment Process). The
district reports that for the fall of 2003, 87% of kindergartners, 91% of sixth grade
students and 81% of ninth grade students received a placement offer to a school of
their choice. LOCAL DEFENDANTS' 2002-2003 ANNUAL REPORT at 15 [hereinafter
"LOCAL DEFENDANTS' REPORT"] (filed in S.F. NAACP v. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist.,
No-78-1445-WHO (N.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 2003)).
The fall 2003 placement data show that substantial numbers of students of
all racial groups were assigned to one of their schools of choice:
Ethnicity Kindergarten Sixth Grade Ninth Grade
African 90.6% 81.1% 85.5%
American
Chinese 90.2% 94.1% 76.2%
Latino 86.1% 89.4% 84.7%
Other White 71.5% 86.6% 59.5%
LOCAL DEFENDANTS' REPORT, supra, at 15-16. The four groups constitute the
vast majority of students in the district. See infra note 122.
117. LOcAL DEFENDANTS' REPORT, supra note 116, at 19-21.
118. See, e.g., 2002 MONITOR'S REPORT, supra note 53, at 96 n.71. See also
S.F. NAACP v. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist., 2001 WL 1922333, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Oct.
24, 2001).
119. For example, the index assigns zeroes when a child's mother has post-high
school experience, when a child comes from a stronger academic school, has
higher achievement scores, is not eligible for public assistance, is English
proficient and speaks English at home. See Excellence for All Plan, supra note
76, at 102. The index assigns ones to the opposite categories. Id. Although this is
done arbitrarily for the purposes of the binary calculations, the fact that the district
has chosen to label these categories as "zeroes" and "ones" adds to confusion and
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system depends on children applying to school in a timely fashion, so
extensive outreach is needed to inform parents that they need to apply. 20 It
is particularly difficult to encourage parents who do not already have
children attending schools in the district to apply in a timely fashion. There
is no systematic way for the school district to know who - such as children
who would be applying for kindergarten - might be eligible to attend its
schools nearly a year in advance.
The monitor's reports have raised other issues with respect to the
results under the Diversity Index. The monitor noted that the Diversity
Index has not reversed what he labels "severe resegregation" of racial
groups. 121 His most recent report predicted that approximately one-third of
the entering classes (kindergarten, sixth and ninth grades) will have student
bodies with at least 60% of one recognized race or ethnicity. 22 He also
noted that in some instances, the composite Diversity Index score shows
that certain schools are nearly perfectly diverse (according to the variables
suspicion about the fairness of the system because it looks like a point system in
which certain children are being penalized for being middle class.
120. See 2002 MONITOR'S REPORT, supra note 53, at 97. See also LOCAL
DEFENDANT'S REPORT, supra note 116, at 10-12 (detailing the school district's
efforts at outreach).
121. The Monitor has adopted his own standard of labeling a particular school
as "severely resegregated" if 60% or more of an entering class will consist of
children of one race or ethnicity. See 2003 MONITOR'S REPORT, supra note 83, at
24. While this has been his personal practice, the figure seems to have been
derived arbitrarily. Other school districts use different figures. See e.g., Comfort
v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 283 F. Supp. 2d 328, 348 (D. Mass. 2003) ("By the Lynn
Plan's definitions, then, an elementary school that enrolled between 43% and 73%
minority students would qualify as racially balanced."). As one commentator on
the San Francisco consent decree noted, it is "inaccurate and patently unfair to
portray the exercise of parental choice for the neighborhood schools as a
phenomenon like 'resegregation."' DIALLO DPHREPAULEZZ, CONSENT DECREE
REVISITED IN SAN FRANCISCO UNIFIED 8 (Pacific Research Inst., 2002) (quotation
in the original), available at http://www.pacificresearch.org/pub/sab/ educat/
ConsentDecree.pdf.
122. 2003 MONITOR'S REPORT, supra note 83, at 24 ("And the most recent
student assignment figures for Fall 2003 show that 35-38 schools [out of 114
schools] are now projected to be severely resegregated (60 % or higher of one
race/ethnicity) at one or more grade levels"). The current student body is
approximately 58,000. Id. at 14. The racial make-up, in order from largest to
smallest, is: Chinese (31.2%); Latino (21.2%), African-American (14.5%); "Other
Non-White" (11.9%); "Other White" (10.0%), Filipino (6.6%); Korean (0.9%);
Japanese (0.9%); Native American (0.6%). 1d. at 15. When the consent decree was
originally approved in 1983, the student body consisted of approximately 65,000
students. At that time, the racial make-up, in order, was African American
(23.1%); Chinese (19.5%); Latino (17.2%); "Other White" (16.9%), "Other Non-
White" (11.9%); Filipino (8.7%); Korean (1.0%); Japanese (1.1%); Native
American (0.6%). Id. at 15 (citing S.F. NAACP v. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist., 576 F.
Supp. 34, 37 (N.D. Cal. 1983)).
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measured in the Index), yet are "severely segregated" by race. 123 On the
other hand, with respect to children of low socioeconomic status, there is
evidence to indicate that they are located throughout the district and that
the district as a whole represents a fairly low SES population.
24
There are many possible reasons for these results. Probably the most
important is the fact that, in common with many other cities, San
Francisco's neighborhoods are often segregated due to housing patterns.
125
The situation is particularly stark in the southeast quadrant of the city,
where the population is disproportionately Latino and African-American.
126
The schools located in those neighborhoods draw students from the
immediate area almost exclusively. Many of these schools are under-
subscribed (the population of the entire district is dropping due to economic
factors such as the high cost of housing in San Francisco) but do not draw
significant numbers of applicants from other parts of the city. Therefore,
the Diversity Index has virtually no impact on assignments to those
schools. 27 The monitor has observed that students from this relatively
isolated location often lack convenient transportation to more desirable
schools, which are located across the city. 128 Thus, the "striking dearth" of
African-American and Latino students in high performing schools located
far from where they live is largely caused by the dearth of applicants of
those ethnicities to those often distant schools. 29 If those students would
choose to apply to, and attend, the high performing schools, their
contribution to diversity according to the non-racial criteria measured by
the school district's Diversity Index would probably give them an excellent
chance of being admitted to those schools.
The monitor has called upon the school district and the parties to
reexamine the efficacy of the Diversity Index in light of the results
summarized here. The monitor has urged consideration of a variety of
123. 2003 MONITOR'S REPORT, supra note 83, at 31-33. The Monitor also notes
that because of the numbers of students utilizing their option to decline to state
their race, there may be even more schools that he would have placed in his"severely resegregated" category. Id. at 42.
124. Id. at 47.
125. See Alfred A. Lindseth, A Different Perspective: A School Board
Attorney's Viewpoint, 42 EMORY L.J. 879, 882 (1993) ("In reality, school boards
have little - or nothing - to do with most of the school segregation that lingers
today.... Where one-race schools persist today, they do so because of housing
patterns, with little or no causal relationship to the former dual school system.").
126. 2003 MONITOR's REPORT, supra note 83, at 61.
127. Id. at 59.
128. Id. at 77 etseq.
129. Id. at 63. There is a general pattern in the city that families tend to choose
neighborhood schools wherever they happen to live. See id. at 65.
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options including changing or replacing the Diversity Index, altering
transportation services, changing programmatic offerings such as where
bilingual and special education programs are located, upgrading after
school programs and improving outreach. 130 So long as race is not used as
a criterion for assignments or race does not become the primary or
predominant consideration for making changes, the Ho plaintiffs are
neutral on these matters.131 A basic tenet of the litigation posture of the Ho
plaintiffs is that school district officials have the authority to make
decisions that they believe are educationally sound, within the legal limits
set by federal and state law.
The monitor has not discussed another issue in his annual reports that
has caused consternation among some parents. Although the monitor is
correct to point out that many schools are under-subscribed, the monitor
has not dwelled to any degree on over-subscribed schools. A relative
handful of schools are extremely popular; they attract many more
applicants than they can possibly serve. 132 The parents who have applied to
these schools - and whose children do not get in to any of their high-choice
schools - conclude that the Diversity Index has not served them well. 133 A
few of the parents who have been made especially upset by the school
130. Id. at 85-86.
131. See, e.g., Levine, supra note 1, at 134 ("Although the settlement bans race-
conscious assignment 'criteria' (or means), it affirms the appropriateness of'residential, geographic, economic, racial and ethnic diversity' as 'considerations'
(or goals) within the limits provided by state and federal law."); id. at 140 ("In
effect, the Ho plaintiffs are saying that the proper place to seek distributive justice
is in the school district itself, with policy set within legal limits by an elected
school board that is highly representative of and responsive to San Francisco's
populace.").
132. See LOCAL DEFENDANTS' REPORT, supra note 116, at 16-18. The report
indicates that the most popular schools receive as many as nine to fourteen
requests for every available place in their respective entering classes. See id. (For
example, Clarendon Elementary School received "906 requests for 101 seats" and
Wallenberg High School received "2315 requests for 160 seats.").
133. This is a clear example of a well-understood phenomenon involving the
difficulty of achieving successful social change in any setting. As two
psychologists explain:
A program targeted for change always functions in a social context
defined by sets of positions and roles within the organization and by
institutions and constituencies (e.g., parents of school children) that make
up the external environment.... Members of role groups stand to gain or
lose when a change is proposed or implemented. Potential losers will
oppose change, either actively or passively, but they may not have the
power to de eat or retard the changesignificantly. Potential gainers will
support the change.
MURRAY LEVINE & DAVID V. PERKINS, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PSYCHOLOGY
351 (2d ed. 1997).
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district's policies have resorted to political tactics to make their point. 34
Many parents find the complex and mechanistic quality of the Diversity
Index to be especially off-putting. They believe that the school district's
purpose in adopting the Index was to distribute higher performing children
to far away 135 and lower performing schools, which they see as detrimental
to the interests of their own children. 136  Their suspicions are further
aroused when school district officials obfuscate the truth by not making it
clear in documents and meetings that the district itself is responsible for the
creation of the Diversity Index.'
37
The superintendent and the school board members are well aware of
these negative feelings towards the operation of the Diversity Index.' 38 The
superintendent has proposed the creation of a broadly representative
committee of school district staff and parents which she would assign the
task of reviewing the Diversity Index and recommending how the student
assignment system should operate after the consent decree expires at the
end of 2005. The Ho plaintiffs plan to participate and eagerly await the
134. See, e.g., May Chow, Parent Group Fights for Neighborhood Schools,
ASIAN WEEK, Sept. 18, 2003, at 14; Ray Delgado, Parents Storm Ackerman's
Office, S.F. CHRON., May 20, 2003, at A13; Heather Knight, Chinese Americans
End School Protest, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 3, 2003, at A21; Tiffany Maleshefski,
School Placement Uproar -Again, THE INDEPENDENT, Aug. 24, 2003, at 1A; Joan
Walsh, John Zhao's Crusade, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 2003, at 60.
135. See Joan Ryan, She's Not Allowed to Walk to School, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 21,
2003, at A15.
136. They also fear violence at certain schools. Heather Knight, Schools May
Start Checking for Weapons, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 26, 2003, at A19 (after student
killed by another student on a public bus going home from school); Jaxon Van
Derbeken, Four Held in Attack at S.F. High School, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 17, 2004, at
A 13 (alleged sexual assault of 14-year-old girl in school bathroom).
137. For example, the school district's web site claims that the Diversity Index
is "required by the October 24, 2001 court order." http://portal.sfusd.edu/template/
default.cfm?page=policy.placement.process (Student Assignment Process).
Compare Amended Stipulation and [Proposed] Order Re Modification and
Termination of Consent Decree, S.F. NAACP v. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist., No. C-78-
1445-WHO at 4 (N.D. Cal. July 11, 2001), available at
http://www.gseis.ucla.edu/courses/edlaw/701settlement.pdf (approved in S.F.
NAACP v. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist., 2001 WL 1922333 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 24. 2001)
(October 24, 2001 court order approving stipulation of all parties, which states that
"the Index was not required by the Court or any party, but was developed by the
school district")).
138. Only one board member seems prepared at present to drop the Diversity
Index. Eddie Chin and David Ho, Dump the Diversity Index, S.F. CHRON., Oct.
16, 2003, at A23 (Chin is Vice President of the school board). The rest of the
elected board currently supports the Diversity Index. Heather Knight, Schools'
Race Plan Endorsed, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 13, 2003, at A15 (rejected, by 6-1 vote,
superintendent's recommendation to modify Diversity Index to allocate up to 50%
of seats in a school for attendance zone residents).
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school district's ultimate proposals.
IV. Conclusion
In Grutter and Gratz, the Supreme Court puts the officials in charge of
public elementary and secondary schools in a quandary. Grutter's
enthusiastic embrace of race-conscious diversity as a compelling
governmental interest is counter-balanced by Gratz's insistence that a
formulaic approach using race mechanically will fail the narrow tailoring
prong of strict scrutiny analysis. Taken together, as a practical matter, the
Supreme Court's two opinions leave public school officials with little
choice but to consider adopting a student assignment system which might
include racial diversity as one of its many goals, but which does not include
race as one of the express means of achieving that goal.
San Francisco's on-going experiment in achieving this delicate
balance bears watching nationally because it might show what can (and,
perhaps, what cannot) be accomplished with its non-racial Diversity Index.
Other school districts may end up emulating San Francisco's experiment,
modifying it, or rejecting it. But the Diversity Index concept deserves
continued attention. There will be more data to examine and to learn from
because the results obtained from using the Diversity Index to assign
students will continue to be carefully scrutinized at least until the Consent
Decree comes to an end in December 2005. The outcome of the
experiment in San Francisco can help school districts nationwide figure out
whether this type of controlled choice plan will help balance competing and
conflicting interests, as we become a more multicultural and multiracial
society.
139
In concluding my previous article on the San Francisco schools case, I
noted that Judge Orrick 140 had used an apt quotation from President John F.
Kennedy in his opinion approving the Ho settlement in 1999. "All of us do
not have equal talent, but all of us should have an equal opportunity to
develop our talents.' 4' The judge went on to capture the essence of the
139. Levine, supra note 1, at 144.
140. Judge William H. Orrick, Jr., who had handled the case from its inception
in 1978, retired from the federal bench in early 2002. Jason Hoppin, Orrick
Leaves the Bench After Storied Career, S.F. RECORDER, Feb. 5, 2002, at 3. His
last important action in the case was to approve the settlement agreement in
October 2001. After twenty-three years of presiding over the case, he turned it over
to Judge William H. Alsup. Judge Orrick died in August 2003 at the age of 87.
Reynolds Holding, William Orrick - U.S. District Judge, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 16,
2003, at A20.
141. Levine, supra note 1, at 142 (quoting S.F. NAACP v. S.F. Unified Sch.
Dist., 59 F. Supp. 2d 1021, 1023 (N.D. Cal. 1999)).
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dispute in the Ho and SF. NAACP suits: "In an effort to provide equal
opportunity for San Francisco's ... schoolchildren of exceptionally diverse
origins, the parties in these two related desegregation cases have
strenuously endeavored to achieve President Kennedy's goal, albeit from
sharply differing viewpoints.' 42  This still captures the nature of the
competing lawsuits very well.
In 2000, I closed my article by noting that, at that time, the school
district had "not yet embraced the agreement it made with the other parties
,,143to achieve a fair and constitutional balance of these interests. In
contrast, with the adoption of the Diversity Index in 2001, in the words of
the Independent Monitor, the school district "deserves great credit for its
good faith efforts to develop and implement a new student assignment plan
under the terms and conditions of the Consent Decree as modified by the
Settlement Agreements of 1999 and 2001."' 44 The Diversity Index is a
work in progress. 45 I anticipate that the school district will be bringing
suggested changes to the other parties over the next two years until the
Consent Decree finally terminates at the end of 2005. Although one cannot
say that the system currently operating in the San Francisco Unified School
District has met the expectations of the biggest boosters of socioeconomic
diversity, 146 the school district may yet come up with an assignment system
which does so. I continue to hope that with the continued good-faith
efforts of the school district and the parties, the Ho case will indeed be seen
as the catalyst for a national public school assignment model, which aims
to achieve President Kennedy's goal of equal opportunity for all without
intruding on anyone's constitutional rights.
47
142. Id.
143. Id. at 144.
144. 2003 MONITOR'S REPORT, supra note 83, at 22.
145. See S.F. NAACP v. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist., 2001 WL 1922333, at *11
(N.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 2001).
146. Compare KAHLENBERG, supra note 101, at 228-57 (discussing practical
experiences with socioeconomic integration plans in other communities).
147. Levine, supra note 1, at 145.
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